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1916), aboard each of which U.S. citizens
died. Each ship was attacked prior to
America’s entry into the war, and each
attack initiated diplomatic fervor and
furor from President Woodrow Wilson
and the United States. Each attack was
avoidable, did little to further Germany’s
war aims, and significantly damaged the
country’s international reputation and
image. Yet it was not these three ships
that Wilson referenced in his 2 April
1917 war message to Congress; rather, it
was the sinking of three U.S. merchant
ships—SS Vigilancia (16 March 1917),
SS City of Memphis (17 March 1917),
and the tanker SS Illinois (18 March
1917)—that became the tipping point
for America’s entry into the war.
As mentioned, the text is interspersed
with numerous photographs and charts
that supplement the content. Readers
will find the book to be an enjoyable
and engaging work. The several appendices, whose contents include photographs of decoded German documents
from Room 40 within the directorate
of intelligence of the British Admiralty, enhance the work by providing a
glimpse of the tedious yet significant
work of intercepting and decrypting
German naval and diplomatic traffic,
including the Zimmermann telegram, to
which the author devotes several pages.
The book’s title is somewhat misleading,
in that out of five sections only one is
devoted to the U-boat assault on the
United States. A more detailed index
would benefit readers. Some readers will
wish for more details on specific boats
or incidents, but Koerver states that he
is writing for a general audience (p. vii).
Thus the work should be read by those
who seek to gain a broader understanding of the First World War at sea and the
importance of U-boats in that conflict.

155

The American Way of Empire: How America Won
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Washington, DC: Washington Books, 2019. 464
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In the second year of the Peloponnesian
War, the Athenian people reproached
Pericles for bringing invasion, plague,
and ruin upon them. Pericles warned
his fellow citizens that Athens possessed an empire and that, while it
might have been wrong to take it, it
would be unsafe to let it go. Persuaded,
the Athenians persisted with policies
that made them even more enemies,
including among erstwhile allies,
ultimately leading to the dissolution
of their empire. In The American Way
of Empire, James Kurth draws on but
departs from Pericles as he offers his
own warning: that America no longer
possesses an empire, and—to those still
seeking to preserve this fallen empire—it
would be unsafe not to let it go.
Kurth, a professor emeritus of political
science at Swarthmore College, is a
luminary of U.S. foreign policy. A PhD
from Harvard who studied under Samuel
P. Huntington, to whom he dedicates the
book, Kurth is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and a senior fellow
at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Kurth has authored over 120 articles, and
he revised some of them to serve as chapters in the book’s five substantive parts,
which are titled “Hegemony,” “Ideology,”
“Strategy,” “Insurgency,” and “Political
Economy.” This composition allows the
reader to absorb the book in chapters
or parts or as a whole. That the chapters
derive from articles originally published
as early as the 1990s yet address current crises so deftly reflects Kurth’s
prescience and the book’s timeliness.

TIMOTHY J. DEMY
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With compellingly creative analysis,
Kurth reveals the causes of the American
empire’s remarkable rise and abrupt
fall. After the Second World War, the
United States cemented three hegemonic
alliance systems as part of the “American
way of empire.” However, that empire
made trade-offs that became time
bombs. For example, the United States
opened its market to its East Asian
allies to keep them out of China’s orbit,
but in doing so it hollowed out the
core of American industry. Because of
these imperial policies, the American
empire has fractured regionally in
Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and
Latin America—and functionally in
its military, economic, political, and
ideological dimensions. In the power
vacuums created by the demise of the
American empire, states such as China,
Russia, and Iran now seek their own
spheres of influence. According to
Kurth, it did not need to end this way.
Kurth attributes the precipitous decline
of the American empire to the deliberate
decisions of its elites. He brings together
American intellectual history, political
economy, culture, and even religion to
explain how this empire lost its way. For
instance, he describes how the Marshall
Plan originally joined the Midwest’s
industry, with its conservative nationalist
tradition, and the Northeast’s finance,
with its liberal international tradition, to
form a grand domestic alliance to promote international free trade as a pillar of
empire. However, over time, an insidious
alliance of ideas and interests coalesced
among American elites who, like Pericles
and the Athenian elites before them,
insisted on defending and extending
the empire to the point of collapse.
America’s elites ultimately succumbed to
the tragic flaw of hubris, in the aftermath
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of the Cold War. Thoroughly convinced
that “American ideas [were] universal
ideas,” they led the United States on the
most ambitious and disastrous imperial
project yet, seeking “to reinvent the
nations of the globe in [the U.S.] image”
(p. 262). American elites ignored not
only the sensibilities and struggles of
their fellow citizens—who today distrust
their leaders, just as the Athenians once
doubted Pericles—but also the interests
of other states and the value systems of
other cultures. They also disregarded
the exigencies of international relations.
Faced with the end of the American
empire, they must come to terms with
the enduring lesson of history: that
“power and realities almost always confound ideology and visions” (p. xviii).
The United States can aspire only to
shape, not to dominate, the twenty-first
century. America must abandon any
illusion that it can remake the world in
its image, particularly given that it has
lost its image of itself. In fact, Kurth
quips, if the United States has any hope
of steering a course toward peace and
prosperity, “America will have to become
more American than it has been in
recent years” by returning to the values
of the American Creed and the virtues
of the American republic (p. 394).
The American Way of Empire gives
the reader much to ponder, without
being ponderous. Kurth entertains and
educates in equal measure, delighting
the reader with many witticisms and
turns of phrase, often turning common
wisdom on its head in the process. In a
discerning inversion of the well-worn
American conception of containment
during the Cold War, Kurth wryly
observes that “in actuality, the most
important containment going on had
been that by the Soviet Union of the
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United States” (p. 23). Herein lies an
admonition for the policy makers and
national-security professionals who
should read The American Way of
Empire: too often America sets forth
to change the world, without realizing
that just as often the world changes it.
JEFFREY P. ROGG

Oilcraft: The Myths of Scarcity and Security That
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Energy analysts often gripe that everyone who drives a car or owns a lightbulb
thinks this provides sufficient training
to claim expertise in energy markets. In
his new book, contrarian University of
Pennsylvania political scientist Robert
Vitalis takes to task mainstream experts
who equate oil with power. At times
breezily polemical, this concise but
richly researched foray is a valuable
contribution to the prolific “geopolitics
of energy” literature in fashion today.
The incisive commentary begins with
the title: the word oilcraft is a play on
witchcraft, not statecraft or tradecraft; it
is explicitly pejorative, not complimentary. Laying his cynical cards on the table
from the outset, Vitalis is unrelenting
in his critique of the “modern-day form
of magical realism” (p. 6) that presumes
that oil is the “lifeblood or weapon or
prize” (p. 23), constituting an axiomatic
truth that consequently requires a special relationship with Persian Gulf nations, military commitments around the
world, and strategic deal making with
unsavory regimes. He derides as a pernicious myth the “need once to control
and now secure access, stabilize prices,
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or prevent hostile powers from holding
the world economy hostage” (p. 122).
Vitalis names names and spares none,
reserving his most incendiary ammunition not for policy makers, as one might
expect, but for his fellow academics.
The analytical core of the book comprises detailed surveys of energy-security
discussions in the 1920s and 1970s. In
the earlier period, policy makers panicked about Britain’s expansive control
of global oil supplies, which prompted
the rise, within the burgeoning field of
international relations, of the so-called
Columbia School, which dismissed
great-power competition as an unnecessary and counterproductive geopolitical
framework for consideration. The
lessons of these debates, Vitalis argues,
were long forgotten by the time resource
scarcity again seized the nation’s consciousness. This later period, beginning
around 1973, is broadly misunderstood.
For instance, it was a group of Arab
countries that imposed the infamous
oil embargo, not the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries; the
upward pressure on oil prices—driven
by a complex host of reasons, including turbulent international financial
conditions—predated the Yom Kippur
War, and therefore was not caused by it,
as is sometimes portrayed. One of the
most interesting points Vitalis makes is
that the resulting higher oil prices fueled
greater development of oil resources
in the United States (e.g., in Alaska
and the offshore Gulf of Mexico).
Other episodes make brief cameos,
recast in a petroleum-tinted light: the
so-called Tanker War between Iran and
Iraq, Operations DESERT STORM and
IRAQI FREEDOM, the development of the
Carter Doctrine, the deployment of U.S.
Marines to Lebanon, and the slew of
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